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et al.: Freedom of Speech & Press

FREEDOM OF SPEECH & PRESS
N.Y. CONST.art. L § 8:
Every citizen may freely speak, write andpublish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrainor abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press.
U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech... or of the press ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Gross v. New York Times, Co. 1037
(decided October 21, 1993)
Plaintiff, the former Chief Medical Examiner of New York
City, ified a complaint against the New York Times Company,
alleging libel. 1038 At issue in this appeal from the dismissal of
the complaint was whether the complaint properly alleged that the
newspaper articles, published by the defendant newspaper,
contained "false, defamatory statements of fact rather than mere
nonactionable statements of opinion"1039 which afford the
defendant free speech protection under the State1040 and
Federal 104 1 Constitutions. The New York Court of Appeals
found that although plaintiff's complaint contained nonactionable

1037. 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1993).
1038. Id. at 149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
1039. Id.
1040. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 8. This section provides in relevant part: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,

being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
1041. U.S. CONST. amend I. This section provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press...." Id.
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opinions, it also included actionable statements of fact. 1042 Thus,
the court held that defendants' motion to dismiss should have
been denied and accordingly reversed the decisions of the trial
court and appellate division. 1043
On January 27, 1985, the newspaper began publishing a series
of articles questioning plaintiff's autopsy findings in a group of
high profile cases where individuals in police custody had died
under mysterious circumstances. 1044 The initial article asserted
that plaintiff had altered autopsy findings, and had instituted a
special policy whereby he performed the autopsies in police
custody cases. 1045 The article also contained interviews with
other pathologists, one who worked with plaintiff, and another
who reviewed some of plaintiffs findings. 104 6 Those interviewed
labeled plaintiff's conduct as "weaseling" and "'unbelievably
incompetent,"' and further intimated that plaintiff was engaging
in illegal conduct. 1047 Subsequent articles characterized
plaintiff's activities as ranging from "'highly suspicious'

. . .

to

'possibly illegal.' 1048
Following a criminal investigation which resolved him of
"professional misconduct [and] criminal wrongdoing," plaintiff
instituted a libel action against the newspaper and affiliated
persons. 1049 Prior to discovery, the defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint, pursuant to section 3211 (a)(7) of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, 10 50 on the ground that the subject newspaper
articles contained merely opinion, rather than actionable
statements of fact, and hence, were protected under the State 105 1
and Federal 1052 Constitutions. 10 5 3 The trial court agreed with the
1042. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 149. 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

149-50, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815."
150, 623 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16
150, 623 N.E.2d at 1166, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
149, 623 N.E.2d at 1165, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 815.

1050. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1993).
1051. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1052. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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defendants, and dismissed the complaint. 1054 The appellate court
affirmed. 1055 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court decisions and sustained plaintiff's complaint. 10 5 6

In reaching its decision, the court explained that while
defamation cases had previously been decided with reference to
state common law, the United States Supreme Court had
"injected a constitutional dimension" into the law of
defamation. 10 5 7 For example, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,10 5 8 the Supreme Court held that a public official would

be precluded from recovering damages for defamatory statements
concerning his official conduct unless he could demonstrate that
the statements were made with "'actual malice' - that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." 1059

The Sullivan decision and other such opinions explained that a
heightened burden of proof imposed on public persons who bring
defamation actions is necessary "to assure unfettered interchange
1053. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 150-51, 623 N.E.2d at 1166, 603 N.Y.S.2d at
816.
1054. Id. at 151, 623 N.E.2d at 1166, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
1055. Id.
1056. Id.
1057. Id. at 152, 623 N.E.2d at 1166-67, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 816-17.
1058. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1059. Id. at 279-80. In Sullivan, a Commissioner of the City of
Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit against four African-American clergymen
and the New York Times Company, alleging that he had been libeled by a fullpage advertisement published in the defendant's newspaper. Id. at 256. The
advertisement detailed certain events occurring in Montgomery, pertaining to
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights movement. Id at 256-58. The
newspaper published the advertisement without inquiry into the veracity of the
allegations contained within, some of which, were found to be untrue, through
subsequent litigation. Id. at 260-61. Although the advertisement did not refer
to respondent by name, he alleged that reference to "the police" would be
understood to encompass him, because he was "the Montgomery
Commissioner who supervised the police department." Id. at 258. The Court
reasoned that imposing an actual malice standard when a public official
brought a defamation suit, was necessary to avoid "self-censorship." Id. at
279. Additionally, the Court considered the promotion of the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. .. ." Id. at 270.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 39

994

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
1060

desired by the people."
Furthermore, in Gross, the court of appeals noted that the
Supreme Court has proclaimed that "the Constitution imposes
10 61 of
stringent limitations upon the permissible scope"

defamation actions, and specifically noted that statements
amounting to mere rhetorical hyperbole have been held
nonactionable.

1062

Although

the

Supreme

Court has

not

recognized a special privilege for statements of opinion, as
opposed to expressions of fact, it has stated that "'a statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
1060. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957));
see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77
(holding that burden of proof is properly placed on plaintiff "ft]o ensure that
true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred..."), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1134 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)
(holding that burden of proof should be placed on plaintiff to ensure that juries
do not compensate unpopular opinion), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Butts the Court found
that the burden of proof rests with plaintiff because "[t]he dissemination of the
individual's opinions on matters of public interest is for us, in the historic
words of the Declaration of Independence, an 'unalienable right' that
'governments are instituted among men to secure.'" Id. at 149.
1061. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 12 (1970).
1062. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 152, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1990). The
Supreme Court in Milkovich discussed the development of defamation law, and
the idea that a public official plaintiff must prove falsity of speech in order to
recover damages. Id.; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
The Hustler Court held that "when ...speech could not reasonably have been
interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved," a public
figure could not be awarded damages for emotional distress "caused by the
publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and
repugnant in the eyes of most." Id. at 50; Old Dominion Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). The Old Dominion Court found that
the use of the word "scabs" by appellant union publication in reference to
appellees could be actionable if such words "were taken out of context and
used in such a way as to convey a false representation of fact." Id. at 286.
However, the Old Dominion Court found that it was not actionable in the
present action, since the word "scab," as used here was "merely rhetorical
hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union
members towards those who refuse to join." Id. at 285-86.
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contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full

constitutional protection.'"

10 63

New York has adopted a similar ideology under its
constitution, and has formulated a test, for determining whether
assertions are nonactionable expressions of opinion, which is
"more flexible and is decidedly more protective of 'the cherished

constitutional guarantee of free speech.'" 1064
Whether a court applies federal or New York law, the
"dispositive inquiry... is 'whether a reasonable [reader] could
have concluded that [the articles were] conveying facts about the
plaintiff.'1065 In New York, the test for determining whether

statements constitute actionable assertions of fact requires the
court to ascertain: "(1) whether the specific language in issue has
a precise meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the
statements are capable of being proven true or false; and (3)
whether either the full context of the communication in which the
statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding
circumstances are such as to 'signal... readers or listeners that
what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.'" 1066

Further, a plaintiff who is a public official must prove that the
defamatory statements were made with actual malice. 1067

1063. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 152, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817
(quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).
1064. Id. (quoting Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 256,
567 N.E.2d 1270, 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 918, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2261 (1991)).
1065. 1d. at N.Y.2d at 152, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817
(quoting 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 139,
603 N.E.2d 930, 934, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2341 (1993)). The Gross court explained that "[s]ince falsity is a necessary
element of a defamation cause of action and only 'facts' are capable of being
proven false, 'it follows that only statemhents alleging facts can properly be the
subject of a defamation action.'" Id. (quoting Von Gufeld, 80 N.Y.2d at 139,
603 N.E.2d at 934, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 829).
1066. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153, 623 N.E.2d at 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
(quoting Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 292, 501 N.E.2d 550, 554,
508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1986) (quoting Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985))).
1067. Id. at 156, 623 N.E.2d at 1170, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 820.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 39

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

In addition, New York continues to apply the common law
distinctions between statements of opinion which imply a factual
basis undisclosed to the reader, 1068 and an opinion which is
either accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which it is
based or does not "imply the existence of undisclosed underlying
facts. ' 10 6 9 "The former are actionable ... because a reasonable
listener or reader would infer that 'the speaker [or writer] knows
certain facts, unknown to [the] audience, which support [the]

opinion and are detrimental to the person [toward] whom [the
communication is directed]"' and not because they represent
"false opinions. ' 10 7 0 The latter, however, are not actionable
because an opinion which is recited after full disclosure of the
facts upon which it is based would be "understood by the
10 7 1
audience as conjecture."
1068. Id. at 153, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818.; see also,
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 434 U.S. 834 (1977). "If an author
represents he has private, first-hand knowledge which substantiates the
opinions he expresses, the expression of opinion becomes as damaging as an
assertion of fact." Id.
1069. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
1070. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153-54, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at
818 (quoting Steinhilber,at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904).
1071. Id. at 154, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818; see also,
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 26-7, (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In a footnote, the dissenting opinion stated that:
Conjecture, when recognizable as such, alerts the audience that the
statement is one of belief, not fact. The audience understands that the
speaker is merely putting forward a hypothesis. Although the hypothesis
involves a factual question, it is understood as the author's 'best guess.'
Of course, if the speculative conclusion is preceded by stated factual
premises, and one or more of them is false and defamatory, an action
for libel may lie as to them. But the speculative conclusion itself is
actionable only if it implies the existence of another false and
defamatory fact.
Id. at 28 n.5; Potomic Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829
F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987). In Potomic Valve & Fitting, the defendant was sued
for defamation based on his statement in an article, accusing his competitor in
the tube fitting business of purposely designing the Bi-lock test "to snow his
customer." 1d. at 1290. The court found that this statement was defendant's
conclusion based on the main points outlined in the article, rather than on any
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The New York Court of Appeals then explained that applying
the foregoing principles to plaintiff's complaint was difficult
because the complaint cited the articles in their entirety as the

basis for the action, rather than citing to specific individual
assertions contained within each article. 1072 Nonetheless, the
court held that the appellate division had erred in affirming the

dismissal of the complaint because the statements contained
within the articles were "not too vague to constitute concrete
accusations of criminality." 1073 The statements were not
actionable because they suggested criminal conduct, 1074 "but

rather because in this context they convey[ed] 'facts' that are
capable of being proven true or false." 1075

special information unknown to the general audience. Id. Based on such
finding, the Potomic court held that "viewed in context [this statement ] is
clearly an opinion, and therefore protected by the First Amendment." Id.
1072. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 154, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
1073. Id. at 154, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
1074. Id. at 154-55, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819; see also
Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 16, 449 N.E.2d 716, 720, 462 N.Y.S.2d
822, 826, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983). "[A]Ithough expressions of
opinion are constitutionally protected, accusations of criminal or illegal
activity, even in the form of an opinion, are not." Id.; Rinaldi v. Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 382, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397
N.Y.S.2d 943, 951, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977) "[T]here is a critical
distinction between opinions which attribute improper motives to a public
officer and accusations, in whatever form, that an individual has committed a
crime or is personally dishonest. No First Amendment protection enfolds false
charges of criminal behavior." Id.
1075. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 155, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
Specifically, the court noted that the alleged defamatory statements were not
made in the heat of the moment, but were "made in the course of a lengthy,
copiously documented newspaper series that was written only after what
purported to be a thorough investigation." Id. at 156, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 819. Furthermore, the articles appeared neither in the editorial
nor "op ed" sections of the paper. Id. Publication of the accusations under
these circumstances thus "'encourag[ed] the reasonable reader to be less
skeptical and more willing to conclude that [they] stat[ed] or impl[ied] facts.'"
Id. (quoting 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 142,
603 N.E.2d 930., 936, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 831 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2341 (1993)).
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Thus, whether a defamation action is governed by the Federal

or New York State Constitution, the law under either is virtually
identical. Both state and federal law require an actual malice

standard when the plaintiff is a public figure. Similarly, the
public official plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly
defamatory statement is false. Further, only facts capable of

being proven true or false are actionable. Lastly, both seek to
preserve and protect "the cherished values embodied in the First
6
Amendment." 107
Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. 1077
(decided November 23, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to free press under the
State 10 78 and Federal1 079 Constitutions was violated because the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that retractions of

earlier broadcasts were false as a matter of law, and because
plaintiff did not prove that defendant acted with "actual
malice." 1080 In addition, defendant contended that the award of
punitive damages to plaintiff should be set aside "since there was

no showing of common-law malice; and that the damages award
[wa]s excessive." 10 81 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, 1082 and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial
1076. Id. at 156, 623 N.E.2d at 1170, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 820; Immuno A.G.
v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 256, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1282, 566
N.Y.S.2d 906, 918 (stating that "the cherished constitutional guarantee of free
speech is preserved"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
1077. 82 N.Y.2d 466, 626 N.E.2d 34, 605 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1993).
1078. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8, which provides in pertinent part: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
1079. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... " Id.
1080. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
221.
1081. Id.
1082. Id. at 470, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. Although the
court of appeals reversed the appellate division's judgment, the reversal was
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court's jury instruction on the issue of falsity, "impermissibly
withdrew from the jury crucial interrelated issues of credibility
and actual malice that are solely [within] the province of the
factfmders." 1083 The court concluded that punitive damages were
not appropriate absent a showing of "common law malice." 10 84
The libel action arose when television and radio stations owned
by defendant broadcasted reports falsely identifying plaintiff as
the victim of an abduction and beating that had occurred the
previous evening. 10 85 The news reports also incorrectly stated
that the FBI was investigating the possibility that plaintiff owed
money to organized crime figures.1 0 86 Neither the police nor the
FBI had released the name of the victim, but during the
defendant's employee meeting and conversation about the
abduction, one of the reporters for Channel Seven News
speculated that plaintiff, John Prozeralik, a prominent Niagara
Falls businessman, may have been the victim because it was "the
first name that came to mind." 1087 According to Cindy DiBiasi,
defendant's news reporter, FBI Agent Thurston confirmed
Prozeralik as the victim, and told her, "You can go with that
unless I call you back." 10 88 Thurston, however, declared that he
never made such a statement, maintaining that he did not know
based solely upon the erroneous jury instruction. Id. Therefore, most of the

lower court analysis of the constitutional issues remained in tact. For example,
the court of appeals was in agreement with the appellate division's reasoning
that constitutional malice was the appropriate standard of review for a
defamation action. Id. at 474, 626 N.E.2d at 38-39, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The
court of appeals, however, reversed the appellate division on the issue of
punitive damages, holding that a showing of common law malice, rather than
actual malice, was necessary to sustain a punitive damage award. Id. at 47980, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
1083. Id. at 470, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
1084. Id. at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
1085. Id. at 471, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. Plaintiff
Prozeralik and his attorneys notified defendant, owner of radio and television
stations, shortly after defendant's broadcast program, that plaintiff was not the
victim in the abduction story. Id. Furthermore, defendant verified that another
man, David Pasquantino, was the victim. Id.
1086. Id. at 470-71, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
1087. Id. at 471, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
1088. Id.
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the victim's name at the time of the phone call and had refused to
confirm or deny any name. 1089 DiBiasi announced her story on
defendant's noon news broadcast, naming Prozeralik as a victim
of kidnapping and beating, possibly due to organized crime
debt. 1090 Furthermore, based upon the information obtained in
the television broadcast, WKLB Radio aired three radio
broadcasts which essentially repeated Channel Seven's
account. 1091
After the misidentification became known, Steven Ridge,
Channel Seven's news director, released a "retraction" on
defendant's two evening broadcasts, which stated: "The FBI
earlier today said and confirmed the victim was Prozeralik, but
our independent investigation is revealing he was not
involved." 1092 Prozeralik commenced a defamation action against
the owner of the television and radio stations shortly after the
broadcasts. Following a jury trial, and a reduction for financial
loss by remittitur, the Supreme Court, Niagara County, awarded
$15,500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 1093 The
appellate division affirmed, and defendant appealed. 1094
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate
division's decision, holding that the trial court's jury instruction,
1089. Id. at 471-72, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
1090. Id. at 470-71, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. Anchorwoman

DiBiasi made the following news report on defendant's noon broadcast:
The FBI is investigating a beating and abduction in Cheektowaga last
night. Today, investigators are questioning John Prozeralik, the owner
of John's Flaming Hearth Restaurant, in Niagara Falls, New York.
Prozeralik was either tricked or forced to the Howard Johnson's in
Cheektowaga according to police, where he was beaten with a baseball
bat or pipe, and tied up. Today, the FBI is investigating the possibility

that Prozeralik owed money to organized crime figures.
Id.

1091. Id. at 470, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. The defendant
broadcast the same report during its 12:45 p.m., 1:45 p.m. and 2:45 p.m.
news program on its radio station. Id.
1092. Id. at 471, 626 N.E.2d at 36-37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21.
1093. Id. at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221. The plaintiff was
awarded "$5.5 million in financial loss and $10 million in punitive damages."
Id.
1094. Id.
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declaring defendant's retractions false as a matter of law, was
erroneous. 1095 By instructing the jury in this manner, the court
found that the trial court had usurped the jury's responsibility to
resolve issues of credibility1 096 and actual malice. 10 97
Determination of these issues, the court explained, "cuts to the
heart of the critical elements necessary to prevail in such
[defamation] cases." 10 98 The court concluded that because the

trial court "failed to tender to the jury its full range of fact
finding options," with respect to the telephone conversations and
the retractions, reversal was necessary. 1099 The court then
conducted an independent review of the evidence in the

1095. Id. The jury instruction read in part:
In the case presently being tried before you, I have determined as a
matter of law that defendant... made certain false statements about the
plaintiff ....This means that it will not be necessary for you to decide
whether or not the plaintiff has proved those elements of his libel case.
Id. The court of appeals found this instruction to be erroneous with regard to
the retractions. Id. However, the court did approve of the instruction with
respect to the original broadcasts. Id. at 473, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605 N.Y.S.2d
at 222. Defendant did not dispute the fact that Prozeralik was not the actual
victim, therefore, the court stated, "there was no error in instructing that the
initial broadcasts were false as a matter of law." Id.
1096. Id. In the instant case, the court of appeals explained that the trial
court's instruction, in effect, directed the jury to completely ignore DiBiasi's
testimony, and accept the FBI agent's account of the telephone conversation
between DiBiasi and himself. Id. Thus, the jury was deprived of its duty to
decide which witness, Thurston or DiBiasi, was the credible one. Id. at 472,
626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221; see generally Dominguez v.
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 528, 534,
388 N.E.2d 1221, 1224, 415 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637 (1979) (stating that
"[a]ssessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses is a
function of the finder of fact").
1097. Prozeralik,82 N.Y.2d at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221
(citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
511 n.30 (1984)). The court of appeals recognized that one critical question
which the court deprived the jury of resolving was whether the defendant
"realized that [its] statement was false or... subjectively entertained serious
doubt as to the truth of [its] statement." Id. at 473, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605
N.Y.S.2d at 222.
1098. Id. at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
1099. Id. at 473, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
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record, 1100 and determined that although reversal was
appropriate, dismissal was not. 110 1
The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the shield
of protection provided by the qualified privilege of free speech
may be defeated by either the common-law or constitutional
standard of malice. 1102 However, in reaching its conclusion, the
court of appeals in the instant case applied federal law, and relied
upon several United States Supreme Court free speech decisions.
For example, the court adopted the "actual malice" standard
developed by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan. 110 3 This standard, which has been enhanced by the
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions, 1104 requires that a public
1100. Id. at 474-75, 626 N.E.2d at 39, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 223. The court of
appeals explained that although courts are normally without the power to
disturb findings of fact and are restricted to review only the law, in defamation
cases courts have a "constitutional duty" to exercise independent judgment in
determining whether evidence in the record establishes actual malice with the
"convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment
protection" guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. (citing Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at
511).
1101. Id. at 478, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225. Based on the
evidence, the court found that plaintiff had met the prima facie burden of proof
required to sustain the defamation action, because even had the jury been
correctly instructed, it could have found that defendant published the
broadcasts with actual malice. Id. at 475, 626 N.E-2d at 39, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
223. Since there was sufficient and convincingly clear evidence to warrant
submitting the case to the jury for its assessment of actual malice, the court
ordered a new trial. Id. at 478, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
1102. See Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 605 N.E.2d 344, 590
N.Y.S.2d 857 (1992). The Liberman court, recognized that the term "malice"
now has "dual meaning." It includes "ill will" or "spite" under the commonlaw standard as well as "knowledge that [the statement] was false
or ...

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" under the

constitutional standard. Id. at 437-38, 605 N.E.2d at 349-50, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
862-63; see also Stillman v. Ford, 22 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 238 N.E.2d 304, 306,
290 N.Y.S.2d 893, 897 (1968) (noting that the qualified privilege protecting
speech is defeated if "defamatory statements were motivated by either 'actual
malice' or 'actual ill-will'").
1103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1104. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). According to
the Supreme Court in St. Amant, "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
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official seeking to recover damages for defamation, first prove,
that the statement was false, and second, that it was published
with "'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false
1105
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
The majority in New York Times recognized protection for
statements that were not published with actual malice, thus
reflecting a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen... . "1106 In Harte-Hanks Communications Inc., v.
Connaughton,1107 the Court emphasized "that the actual malice

standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or
'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term." 110 8 Rather, as the
Court stated in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.,1109 a plaintiff wishing to prove actual malice is required to
show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant knew that
her statement was false, or that she "subjectively entertained
serious doubt" as to the truth of her statement. 1110
The court also relied upon Mahoney v. Adirondack Publishing
Co., 1 1 1 1 a free speech decision based upon the constitutional

standard of "actual malice." 1112 In Mahoney, the court held that
plaintiff could not infer actual malice because the false
1113
publication was a product of misperception, not fabrication.
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." Id.
1105. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.

1106. Id. at 270.
1107. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
1108. Id. at 666.

1109. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
1110. Id. at 511 n.30.
1111. 71 N.Y.2d 31, 517 N.E.2d 1365, 523 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1987).

1112. d. at 36 n.1, 517 N.E.2d at 1367 n.1, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 481 n.l. The
Mahoney court stated that the dispositive issue on appeal was whether the

plaintiff had proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendants published
the false assertions "knowing they [false assertions] were false or subjectively
entertaining serious doubts as to their truth." Id. at 37, 517 N.E.2d at 1367,
523 N.Y.S:2d at 481 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280

(1964)).
1113. Mahoney, 71 N.Y.2d at 40, 517 N.E.2d at 1369, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
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The Mahoney court determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's conclusion of actual malice because
plaintiff did not establish that defendant "knew the account was
false or entertained doubt as to its truth.' 1114 It was more likely,
the court explained, that the statements were a product of
misunderstanding. 1115 The court in Prozeralik stated that the
instant case was a "different" and "stronger" case than Mahoney,
and factually distinguished the two cases. 1116 In Prozeralik,
plaintiff presented direct evidence from which a jury could infer
"that the defendant knew or suspected that Prozeralik was not the
victim" of the attack. 1117 Moreover, FBI agent Thurston gave
testimony, which, had it been rightfully reviewed by the jury,
could have supported a finding that defendant published the
retractions with actual malice. 1118 Therefore, the court
concluded, dismissal of plaintiff's action was not proper. 1119
The court addressed defendant's remaining contention as to
whether punitive damages can be awarded absent "common law
1114. Id. at 39, 517 N.E.2d at 1368, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
1115. Id. at 39-40, 517 N.E.2d at 1368-69, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 483-84.
1116. Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 476-77,
477, 626 N.E.2d 34, 40, 605 N.Y.S.2d 218, 224 (1993). In Mahoney, the
defendant published a story in the sports section of a newspaper which
proffered a reporter's account of a football coach "verbally abusing" his
players. Mahoney, 71 N.Y.2d at 36-37, 517 N.E.2d at 1367, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
481. The reporter based his story upon statements which he allegedly heard at
the game. Id. At trial, it was found that the coach had not uttered the words
attributed to him, although what he did in fact say sounded similar. Id. at 37,
517 N.E.2d at 1368, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 482. The court concluded that actual
malice could not be inferred from a mere misunderstanding. Id. at 39-40, 517
N.E.2d at 1368-69, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 483-84.
1117. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 477, 626 N.E.2d at 40, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
224.
1118. Id. at 477-78, 626 N.E.2d at 40-41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25. In
partial dissent, Justice Levine, relying on Mahoney, reasoned that there was
insufficient proof to establish actual malice because even if a jury would accept
Thurston's version of the telephone conversation, there was not (based on this
record) clear and convincing evidence that DiBiasi could not have
"misunderstood" Thurston's version of what he told her over the telephone. Id.
at 483-84, 626 N.E.2d at 44, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 228-29 (Levine, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1119. Id.at 478, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
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malice."1120 The appellate division only required a showing of
actual malice for an award of punitive damages, despite the
contention proffered by both the defendant and dissenting Justice
Lawton, that "common-law malice" or "conscious ill will" was
necessary to sustain the punitive damage award. 112 1 The
appellate court relied upon the federal standard which was
developed by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc., 112 2 and reasoned that an award of punitive damages may be
justified if "the evidence establishes defendant's indifference to

plaintiff's rights, manifested by a reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of its statements." 1123 The court of appeals, however,
determined that "actual malice" under the New York Times
standard was not sufficient by itself to permit an award of
punitive damages. 1124 The court explained that "circumstances
of... outrage, . . . spite, ... fraudulent or evil motive on the
part of defendant" must exist to justify the public policy behind
punitive damage awards. 1125 The court concluded that although
there was no evidence in this record to support the inference that
defendant published the reports out of "hatred," "ill will" or

1120. Id. at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225. The court
recognized that had a new trial not been ordered, the jury instruction on the
issue of punitive damages would not have been reviewed because defendant
had not objected to it. Id. However, the court noted its disapproval of the
instruction "so as to provide guidance on the new trial and to settle the issue
for future cases." Id. at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
1121. Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 188 A.D.2d 178,
185-88, 593 N.Y.S.2d 662, 667-69 (4th Dep't 1993).
1122. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz standard states that in a defamation
action, involving a matter of public concern, punitive damages may not be
awarded absent a showing of actual malice. Id. at 349.
1123. Prozeralik, 188 A.D.2d at 185, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
1124. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
226.
1125. Id. (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (5th
ed. 1984). For public policy purposes, punitive damages are intended to
remedy the "defendant's mental state in relation to the plaintiff and the motive
in publishing the falsity .... " 82 N.Y.2d at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605
N.Y.S.2d at 226.
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"spite," a different determination may be established during the
12 6
new trial. 1
Both the State and Federal Constitutions provide the press with
broad protection of free speech by requiring defamatory
statements to be published with "actual malice." Under the
Federal Constitution, only a showing of actual malice is
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages. However,
New York law, seems to require an additional showing of
common-law malice, finding "actual malice ... insufficient by
itself to justify an award of punitive damages .... 1127 Together,
these requirements not only reduce the "chilling effect" that large
libel judgments may have on the "full and unfettered expression
of ideas," but more importantly, 1128 these standards guarantee
that the "broad cloak of protection afforded the press under the
State and Federal Constitutions,... does not extend to the
1129
reckless and irresponsible infliction of injury by defendant."
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Polish American Immigration Relief Committee, Inc. v.
13 0

Relax 1
(decided April 13, 1993)

Plaintiff, Polish American Immigration Relief Committee, Inc.
[hereinafter PAIRC], a Polish immigrant aid corporation, brought
suit against the magazine publisher and editor of "Relax," a
small-circulation Polish language magazine, to recover for libel
based upon the contents of a letter to the editor, and an interview,

1126.
226.
1127.
1128.
1129.
1130.

Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
Id. at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226 (1993).
Prozeralik, 188 A.D.2d at 186, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
Id.
189 A.D.2d 370, 596 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1993).
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which were published in its February 4, 1989, issue. 1 13 1 In its
defense, defendants claimed that the statements complained of
were constitutionally protected opinion under both the New York
State 113 2 and Federal 1133 Constitutions 1134 . The court held that

the statements at issue were non-actionable expressions of
opinion under
standards. 1135

both

the federal

and

state

constitutional

The subject of this lawsuit was a letter written by Marian
Jablonski, a recent Polish immigrant. 1136 Mr. Jablonski
complained about his family's treatment by PAIRC and the Polish
1137 In
American Congress upon their arrival to the United States.
the letter, Mr. Jablonski referred to the plaintiffs as "thieves who
should have been put in prison long ago." 113 8 Subsequently, Mr.
Jablonski and his wife were interviewed, and Mr. Jablonski had
an opportunity to elaborate on the letter. 113 9 During the course of
that interview, Mr. Jablonski explained why he considered
PAIRC a "madhouse." 114°
1131. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
1132. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section 8 provides in pertinent part: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
1133. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... " Id.
1134. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 372, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
1135. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
1136. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
1137. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 756-57.
1138. Id. at 371, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
1139. Id.
1140. Id. The comments which form the basis of plaintiff's claim included
the following: "'PAIRC is a madhouse. For instance, they won't pick up
people at the airport. Last year there was nobody to meet four families.'"
Furthermore, he also stated:
As I said, I don't regret having left Poland. There's a lesson for me:
forget the PAIRC, forget the Polish American Congress, forget others.
Let them do their fund raisers that nobody understands the aim of, let
them pretend they are just and democratic, let them have their pictures
taken with whomever they choose, let them listen to national anthems. I
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Mr. Jablonski's letter and the substance of his interview were
published in "Relax."1141 However, the magazine did not imply
that the facts and opinions stated were accurate. 1142 In fact, the
article was prefaced by a statement from the editor, Mr. Heyduk,
which stated: "[t]he text really speaks for itself, yet if anything
remains to be said, it is the institutions referred to that should say
it."1143 In addition, Mr. Heyduk notified the plaintiffs and
offered to publish an article exhibiting plaintiffs version of the
facts, but the plaintiffs failed to respond. 1144 Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs claimed that the article published constituted libel and
defamation. However, the defendants claimed that "the
statements complained of were constitutionally protected
opinion." 1 14 5
The court acknowledged the differing federal and state
standards used to evaluate the contents of speech alleged to be
constitutionally protected. 1 14 6 With respect to the federal test, the
court found that under such test, "the court must first define the
words as they are commonly understood, then determine whether
the words are subject to verification, and lastly, examine the type
of speech at issue." 1147 As the court explained, "[o]nly if the
expression fell within the category of loose, figurative, or
hyperbolic speech could the impression that an apparently
myself have found a job in my own occupation, and so I now have a
chance to move out of here and really start living on my own instead of

just treading water. The farther away from false do-gooders, the better.
Id. at 371-72, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757. In addition, with respect to Jablonski's
claim that PAIRC pays rent for unoccupied apartments in a building that "is
rumored to be owned by the director of the PAIRC," he stated "You know
how it is. The PAIRC gets funds for immigrants from the Americans, from the
federal government, so it is better to report that all the apartments are
occupied, that rent must be paid and so on. This way business is booming." Id.
at 372, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
1141. Id.
1142. Id.
1143. Id.
1144. Id.
1145. Id.

1146. Id. at 373, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
1147. Id.
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verifiable assertion was intended, be negated." 114 8 As for the
New York standard, the court set forth the "content, tone and
114 9
purpose" test mandated by the New York State Constitution.
However, despite the fact that the federal and state standards
differ, the court recognized that under either standard, the
dispositive issue is the same: "whether a reasonable listener
could conclude that the defendant is conveying facts." 1150
In order to determine whether the publication at issue in this

case could be understood to mean that the speaker was conveying
"facts," the court set out to distinguish between a "pure
opinion," which is not actionable under New York law, and a
"mixed opinion," which is actionable. 115 1 Relying on Gross v.
New York Times Co.,1152 the court defined a "pure opinion" as
"a statement of opinion which discloses the facts relied on, or

1148. Id. To illustrate the application of this standard, the court cited
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), where
the Supreme Court held that the term "blackmail," used during a heated public
debate, was not actionable because "[n]o reader could have thought that either
the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their words
were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense." Id.
1149. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 372, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. This test originated
in Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1986). The Steinhilber court stated that "[t]he essential task is to decide
whether the words complained of, considered in the context of the entire
communication and of the circumstances in which they were spoken or written,
may be reasonably understood as implying the assertion of undisclosed facts
justifying the opinion." Id. at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
1150. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 373, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
1151. Id. at 374, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 758. In Steinldlber, the New York Court
of Appeals set forth the reasoning behind this distinction. The court stated that
"[ain expression of pure opinion is not actionable. It receives the Federal
constitutional protection accorded to the expression of ideas, no matter how
vituperative or unreasonable it may be." 68 N.Y.2d at 289, 501 N.E.2d at
552, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (citations omitted). In contrast, "[t]he actionable
element of a 'mixed opinion' is not the false opinion itself - it is the implication
that the speaker knows certain facts, unknown to his audience, which support
his opinion and are detrimental to the person about whom he is speaking." Id.
at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (citations omitted).
1152. 180 A.D.2d 308, 587 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1992), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, No. 178, 1993 WL 41949 (N.Y, Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1993).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 39

1010

TOURO LAW REVIEW

does not suggest that it is based on undisclosed facts,"

[Vol 10
1153

and a

"mixed opinion" as one which is "published with actual malice
as to the facts underlying the opinion," and therefore
actionable. 1154
The court found the words at issue here to be "pure opinion,"
and therefore, constitutionally permissible under the State and
Federal Constitutions. 1 15 5 It characterized the statements as
"rhetorical hyperbole and vigorous epithet,"1156 and concluded

that "a reasonable reader would not interpret the expressions as
factual."

1 15 7

In reaching its decision, the court focused on the

fact that the publication in question was based upon a letter
written to the editor of a magazine. 1 15 8 In the court's opinion,
this fact assures that "[n] o reasonable person would conclude that

PAIRC was literally a 'madhouse,' or that actual criminality is

1153. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. See also John Grace
& Co. v. Todd Assocs., 188 A.D.2d 585, 585-86, 591 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (2d
Dep't 1992) (holding engineering company's report which indicated that
plaintiff was responsible for project delays to be pure opinion since the
expressions in the report "were adequately supported by the statement of the
underlying facts"(citations omitted)); Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
778 F.2d 711, 718 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that a cartoon depicting a nursing
home that was closed down by state order constituted a pure opinion because
"[tihe statement was not capable of verification.").
1154. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. See also Zeevi v.
Union Bank of Switzerland, 1993 WL 148871 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1993)
(holding statements contained in a Criminal Referral Form concerning a
former employee to be actionable as a "mixed opinion" because the statement
suggests that it is based upon underlying facts which are not disclosed).
1155. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
1156. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758. See also Old Dominion Branch No.
496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974) (finding the word "scab" used in a
union publication to describe nonunion letter carriers to constitute "merely
rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by
union members towards those who refuse to join"); Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding the word
"blackmail" as used in an article about a public figure to be "no more than
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered
Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable").
1157. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
1158. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
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charged by the epithets 'thieves' and 'false do-gooders.'" 1159 In
addition, the court took into account the underlying free speech
considerations involved in situations of this kind, and the
1160
importance of encouraging a public forum.
It has often been noted that the New York test is broader than
the federal test. 116 1 The federal test first requires a determination
of "whether challenged expression.

. .

would reasonably appear

to state or imply assertions of objective fact[,I" and second, the
determination of "the impression created by the words used as
well as the general tenor of the expression, from the point of
view of the reasonable person." 1 162 In contrast, the state test

examines "the content of the whole communication, its tone and
apparent purpose."1 16 3 In discussing the distinction between the

two tests, the Immuno AG. court observed that by "[ilsolating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied

factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they
were uttered," as required under federal law, an application of

the federal test "may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering

that expression in context." 1164
Nevertheless, while the two tests diverge somewhat, the focus

of the inquiry under both standards are the same: "whether a
reasonable listener could conclude that the defendant is conveying
1159. Id. at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
1160. Id. at 375-76, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (citing Immuno AG. v. MoorJankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 255, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1281-82, 566 N.Y.S.2d
906, 917-18 (1991) (discussing the public function of letters to the editor)).
1161. See Imunuuo AG., 77 "N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 914 (stating that "'protection afforded by the guarantees of free
press and speech in the New York Constitution is often broader than the
minimum required by' the Federal Constitution") (citing O'Neill v. Oakgrove
Constr., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 529 n.3, 523 N.E.2d 277, 280 n.3, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1,
4 n.3 (1988)); 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 145,
603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992) (stating that the federal
test is narrower).
1162. Immuno AG., 77 N.Y.2d at 243, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
1163. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
1164. Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
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facts." 1165 Moreover, as is demonstrated by the case law, both
tests often yield the same result. 1166 Thus, as long as an
offensive utterance appears to communicate facts, it will be
actionable under both state and federal law.

1165. Relax, 189 A.D.2d at 373, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (citations omitted).
1166. See, e.g., 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130,
145, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992) (finding statements
made at a public hearing were not actionable defamation under Federal or State
Constitutions); McGill v. Parker, 179 A.D.2d 98, 107-09, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91,
97-98 (1st Dep't 1992) (finding statements published in pamphlets and leaflets
regarding the treatment of New York City carriage horses considered protected
opinion under federal and state law).
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